An experimental study of the Online Information Paradox: Does en-route information improve road network performance?

This study investigates the empirical presence of a theoretical transportation paradox, defined as the "Online Information Paradox" (OIP). The paradox suggests that, for certain road networks, the provision of online information deteriorate travel conditions for all users of that network relative to the situation where no online information is provided to users. The analytical presence of the paradox was derived for a specific network structure by using two equilibrium models, the first being the Expected User Equilibrium (EUE) solution (no information scenario) and the other being the User Equilibrium with Recourse (UER) solution (with information scenario). An incentivised computerised route choice game was designed using the concepts of experimental economics and administered in a controlled laboratory environment to investigate the physical presence of the paradox. Aggregate statistics of path flows and Total System Travel Costs (TSTC) were used to compare the experimental results with the theoretical findings. A total of 12 groups of 12 participants completed the experiment and the OIP and the occurrence of the OIP being significant was observed in 11 of the 12 cases. Though information increased travel costs for users on average, it reduced the volatility of travel costs experienced in the no information scenario indicating that information can achieve a more reliable system. Further replications of similar experiments and more importantly field based identification of the phenomena will force transport professionals to be aware of the emergence of the paradox. In addition, studies such as this emphasise the need for the adoption of adaptive traffic assignment techniques to appropriately model the acquisition of information on a road network

Incomplete Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence

Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctioning. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show that the structure of punishment network significantly affects allocations to the public good. In addition, we observe that network configurations are more important than punishment capacities for the levels of public good provision, imposed sanctions and economic efficiency. Lastly, we show that targeted revenge is a major driver of anti-social punishment

Axelrod’s metanorm games on networks

Metanorms is a mechanism proposed to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental results show that network structures that underlie social interactions influence the emergence of norms that promote cooperation. We generalize Axelrod’s analysis of metanorms dynamics to interactions unfolding on networks through simulation and mathematical modeling. Network topology strongly influences the effectiveness of the metanorms mechanism in establishing cooperation. In particular, we find that average degree, clustering coefficient and the average number of triplets per node play key roles in sustaining or collapsing cooperationSpanish MICINN projects CSD2010-00034 (CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010) and DPI2010-16920, and by the Junta de Castilla y Leo´ n, references BU034A08 and GREX251-2009